Abstract. During their long exile during 1940-1944, various components of the "Free French" were largely kept out of the "Post-War Planning" process that took place in the American State Department.
general after De Gaulle ordered Free French marines to re-take the islands of St Pierre and Miquelon off the coast of Canada from Vichy forces in 1941 without telling the authorities in London or Washington, or even those in Ottawa. 4 Roosevelt initially wanted to send an American battleship to remove the upstarts until persuaded against doing so by the Canadian government. 5 After that there was little love lost between De Gaulle and Roosevelt's Administration. De Gaulle was not by any means the favoured candidate of the Anglo-Saxon Allies for any future leadership of France. Only
Churchill both loved France and, most of the time, admired De Gaulle. Philip Sydney's sobriquet, "that sweet enemy, France". 7 However it is undeniable that all three
Powers played key roles in defining what the "West" would and should be and, amongst them, they were instrumental in forging the main theories and practices of international relations for a good part of the last 100 years. Sometimes this has led to what might be called "progressive" or even "liberal" thinking; sometimes it has led to massive divergence of thinking. 8 The creation of international organisations is one of the greatest "liberal" ideas in international relations. France played an important role in setting up the League of Nations after 1918, especially through the initiatory role before and during the First World War of Senator Léon Bourgeois. This influence continued through to the 1930s, led by French foreign minister -and on occasion premier -Aristide Briand. 9 Broadly speaking, French thinkers and politicians believed international organisations should build on the early twentieth century tradition of bi-and multi-lateral legal agreements to limit armaments and enshrine the necessity for peace in globally-binding documents, of which the Franco-American Kellogg-Briand pact to outlaw war in 1928 was the crowning glory.
These declarations and the legalistic spirit that inspired them never much impressed the Anglo-Saxon governments in London and Washington, even if some prominent British and American input smoothed their passage in the League. 10 But by the early 1930s many in France, especially on the right, had come to doubt that what Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu called the "plate-forme de Genève", where the League was based;
it had produced nothing more than a "République des mots" and, moreover, one where France's interests were routinely flouted and traduced, not least by French politicians like Briand. So, for example, the prolonged agony of the League's Disarmament Conferences from 1925 to 1934 had led to scant rewards for France's security needs. The main beneficiaries of this neglect were said to be mainly the "Anglo-Saxon" Powers, Britain and the United States, as well as Germany. France was portrayed as being outflanked and outgunned in the battle of ideas and in international politics more broadly. 11 So the idea of what international organisations should aim to achieve was already one
where France felt both a strong sense of co-ownership, and also one of having been stripped of that by the "Anglo-Saxons" well before the subject of a next generation of international organisations arose as a result of the Second World War. When Roosevelt proclaimed a renewed vision of international organisations as part of his "New World Order" and had that elaborated as part of the largely Anglo-American process known as "Post-War Planning" after 1941, France's voice was conspicuously absent in both official meetings and as part of the Post-War Planning process.
Arguably other exiled governments that had had the good sense to establish themselves in Washington -rather than London or Algiers as did the Free French -had the ear of the post-war planners more than did the Free French. article, "Beyond the Atlantic Charter", until the United States adopted "a precise policy about the organization of the peace, the Allies had no other choice than to await on events" [rester dans l'expectative]. He also reminded his readers that these Allies were also worried about another "volteface" like that of 1919. 27 It was of course not true that no Post-War Planning had yet taken place, although the main committee set up under the overall jurisdiction of Welles only started work in early 1942. But in the febrile atmosphere of Washington at that period, it was easy for the French in particular to feel they were being left out of the discussions, especially given Welles' well-known antipathy towards De In 1944-1945, Free French officials were generally despondent about the loss of European influence in the world. In the first general file from after the Liberation, an anonymous summary muses that whilst Europe and Western "civilisation" were not quite "decadent", a term taken from Arnold Toynbee's oft-quoted writings, the very idea of them was now "morally ambiguous". Europe had certainly lost its sense of being "pre-eminent". Europe's fate was now being decided by three 35 But the Free French were not informed of these plans and would not have approved of them if they had.
The French were also not entirely excluded from the emerging plans for international So France was to be excluded from the very top to stop a repeat of the "lack of harmonisation of economic and political interests" that had happened after the First World War. So France had to participate in the big conferences that were to come, and he felt the Free French must take the lead. France must do its utmost to co-ordinate efforts with the British as a consequence, as well as look to a security alliance with them and the Benelux countries to protect the northeast of France. 41 American army and air force backing him. The "restoration" or "reconstruction" of France certainly had to be done in co-operation with the Anglo-Americans, but not only by them. 43 Right up to and including June 1944, the Free French were wary that Roosevelt in particular was using every ruse possible to avoid including them in serious planning of a future global order.
As Alphand put it in mid-June 1944, "as I have always believed, the key to the problem remains the White House . . . the attitude of the President does not seem to have varied". He had great hopes that De Gaulle's first visit to Bayeux in Normandy after the liberation would do something to change Roosevelt's attitude. 44 Alphand, Massigli, and De Gaulle worried that they were not only being excluded from these international organisation discussions but also from the EAC; chaired by the American ambassador at London, John Winant, it first met in January 1944 to decide on the wider implications of the liberation of Europe. Composed of the Big Three, the EAC did not include France or the other Allied governments, and they were merely asked for their "opinions". A later comment in August 1944 by
Massigli recorded that the now retired Welles had stated in his recent book that he "did not consider
France as being a key member of the permanent council [directoire permanent] of the Powers". Even though France, by now led by the GPRF, was invited onto the EAC not long afterwards -on 27
August -the issue added to those that irritated the French hierarchy. whom Cecil had said was "rather feeble physically and cannot see very much" and makes speeches of "interminable length". 50 The Commission was therefore in effect a declaration of independent intent, for the American government had set its sights firmly against any repetition of the mistakes of 1919.
But a second declaration of independence then followed when the French delegation for San Gaulle and his officials replied it would only do this if it was allowed to add that France had had no part in the Dumbarton Oaks discussions and that it had numerous amendments to propose. The Big Three, particularly Stalin, took extreme umbrage and told De Gaulle through Henri Bonnet that he had 48 hours to agree with the proposal or the invitation would be rescinded. To cut a very long story short, the French refused, in spite of several more extensions of the deadline, and did not send out the invitations. 52 France did nonetheless attend the San Francisco Conference, was granted permanent seat on the Security Council, and played a constructive role there. France had maybe proved its "Great
Power" status and "liberty of action", for only Great Powers could say no to the Big Three. But the exclusion from participation in Yalta, "manifestly signifying their lost status", also fostered a feeling in Paris that the French were now subject to a "keenly disliked Anglo-American and then a United
States-Soviet hegemony". 
